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Abstract
Within the expected-utility framework, the only explanation for risk aversion is that
the utility function for wealth is concave: A person has lower marginal utility for addi-
tionalwealthwhen sheiswealthythan whensheispoor. This paperprovidesatheorem
showing that expected-utility theory is an utterly implausible explanation for apprecia-
ble risk aversion over modest stakes: Within expected-utility theory, for any concave
utility function, even very little risk aversion over modest stakes implies an absurd
degree of risk aversion over large stakes. Illustrative calibrations are provided.
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Using expected-utility theory, economists model risk aversion as arising solely because the utility
function over wealth is concave. This diminishing-marginal-utility-of-wealth theory of risk aver-
sion is psychologically intuitive, and surely helps explain some of our aversion to large-scale risk:
We dislike vast uncertainty in lifetime wealth because a dollar that helps us avoid poverty is more
valuable than a dollar that helps us become very rich.
Y et this theory also implies that people are approximately risk neutral when stakes are small.
Arrow(1971,p. 100)showsthatanexpected-utilitymaximizerwithadifferentiableutilityfunction
will always want to take a sufficiently small stake in any positive-expected-value bet. That is,
expected-utility maximizers are (almost everywhere) arbitrarily close to risk neutral when stakes
are arbitrarily small. While most economists understand this formal limit result, fewer appreciate
that the approximate risk-neutrality prediction holds not just for negligible stakes, but for quite
sizable and economically important stakes. Economists often invoke expected-utility theory to
explainsubstantial(observedorposited)riskaversionoverstakeswherethetheoryactuallypredicts
virtual risk neutrality.
While not broadly appreciated, the inability of expected-utility theory to provide a plausible
account of risk aversion over modest stakes has become oral tradition among some subsets of re-
searchers, and has been illustrated in writing in a variety of different contexts using standard utility
functions.
1 In this paper, I reinforce this previous research by presenting a theorem which cali-
brates a relationship between risk attitudes over small and large stakes. The theorem shows that,
within the expected-utility model, anything but virtual risk neutrality over modest stakes implies
manifestly unrealistic risk aversion over large stakes. The theorem is entirely ‘‘non-parametric’’,
assuming nothing about the utility function except concavity.
In the next section I illustrate implications of the theorem with examples of the form ‘‘If an
expected-utility maximizer always turns downmodest-stakes gamble X, she will always turndown
large-stakes gamble Y .’’ Suppose that, from any initial wealth level, a person turns down gambles
wheresheloses $100 or gains $110, each with 50%probability. Then she will turn down 50-50 bets
4 See Epstein (1992), Epstein and Zin (1990), Hansson (1988), Kandel and Stambaugh (1991), Loomes and Segal
(1994), and Segal and Spivak (1990). Hansson’s (1988) discussion is most similar to the themes raised in this paper.
He illustrates how a person who for all initial wealth levels is exactly indifferent between gaining $7 for sure and a
50-50 gamble of gaining either $0 or $21 prefers a sure gain of $7 to any lottery where the chance of gaining positive
amounts of money is less than 40% – no matter how large the potential gain is.
1of losing $1,000 or gaining any sum of money. A person who would always turn down 50-50 lose
$1,000/gain $1,050 bets would always turn down 50-50 bets of losing $20,000 or gaining any sum.
These are implausible degrees of risk aversion. The theorem not only yields implications if we
know somebody will turn down a bet for all initial wealth levels. Suppose we knew a risk-averse
person turnsdown 50-50 lose $100/gain $105 bets for any lifetime wealth level less than $350,000,
but knew nothing about the degree of her risk aversion for wealth levels above $350,000. Then we
know that from an initial wealth level of $340,000 the person will turn down a 50-50 bet of losing
$4,000 and gaining $635,670.
The intuition for such examples, and for the theorem itself, is that within the expected-utility
framework turning down a modest-stakes gamble means that the marginal utility of money must
diminish very quickly for small changes in wealth. For instance, if you reject a50-50 lose $10/gain
$11 gamble because of diminishing marginal utility, it must be that you value the 11
th dollar above
your current wealth by at most
￿f
￿￿ as much as you valued the 10|￿-to-last-dollar of your current
wealth.
2 Iterating this observation, if you have the same aversion to the lose $10/gain $11 bet if




S as much as your 10|￿-to-last dollar. Y ou will value your 220
th dollar by at most ￿
2f as much
as your last dollar, and your 880|￿ dollar by at most
￿
2cfff of your last dollar. This is an absurd rate
for the value of money to deteriorate — and the theorem shows the rate of deterioration implied by
expected-utility theory is actually quicker than this. Indeed, the theorem is really just an algebraic
articulation of how implausible it is that the consumption value of a dollar changes significantly
as a function of whether your lifetime wealth is $10, $100, or even $1,000 higher or lower. From
such observations we should conclude that aversion to modest-stakes risk has nothing to do with
the diminishing marginal utility of wealth.
Expected-utility theory seems to be a useful and adequate model of risk aversion for many pur-
poses, and it is especially attractive in lieu of an equally tractable alternative model. ‘‘Extremely-
concave expected utility’’ may even be useful as a parsimonious tool for modeling aversion to
modest-scale risk. But this and previous papers make clear that expected-utility theory is mani-
5 My wording here, as in the opening paragraph and elsewhere, gives a psychological interpretation to the concavity
of the utility function. Y et a referee has reminded me that a common perspective among economists studying choice
under uncertainty has been that the concavity of the utility function need be given no psychological interpretation. I
add such psychological interpretation throughout the paper as an aid to those readers who, like me, find this approach
tobe the natural way to think about utility theory, but of coursethemathematical results and behavioral analysis in this
paper hold without such interpretations.
2festly not close to the right explanation of risk attitudes over modest stakes. Moreover, when the
specific structure of expected-utility theory is used to analyze situations involving modest stakes
— such as in research that assumes that large-stake and modest-stake risk attitudes derive from the
same utility-for-wealth function— it can be very misleading. In the concluding section, I discuss a
few examples of such research where the expected-utility hypothesis is detrimentally maintained,
and speculate very briefly on what set of ingredients may be needed to provide a better account of
risk attitudes. In the next section, I discuss the theorem and illustrate its implications.
2. Some Calibrations Based on a Theorem
Consider an expected-utility maximizer over wealth, ￿, with Von Neumann-Morgenstern prefer-
ences LE￿￿. Assume that the person likes money and is risk-averse: For all ￿, LE￿￿ is (strictly)
increasing and (weakly) concave. Suppose further that, for some range of initial wealth levels and
for some }:,:f, she will reject bets losing $, or gaining $}, each with 50% chance.
3 From
the assumption that these bets will be rejected, the theorem presented in this paper places an upper
bound on the rate at which utility increases above a given wealth level, and a lower bound on the
rate at which utility decreases below that wealth level. Its proof is a short series of algebraic ma-
nipulations; both the theorem and proof are in the appendix. Its basic intuition is straightforward,
as described briefly in the introduction.
The theorem handles cases where we know a person to be averse to a gamble only for some
ranges of initial wealth. A simpler corollary, also in the appendix, holds when we know a lower
boundonriskaversion forall wealthlevels. Table1illustratessomeofthecorollary’simplications:
Consider an individual who is known to reject, for all initial wealth levels, 50-50, lose $100/gain }
bets, for } ’ m￿f￿, m￿fD, m￿￿f,a n dm￿2D. The table presents implications of the form ‘‘the person
will turn down 50-50 gambles of losing u and gaining C,’’ where each u is a row in the table and
the highestC (using the bounds established by the corollary) making the statement true is the entry
6 The assumption that X isconcaveisnotimplied bythefactthatanagentalwaysturnsdownagiven better-than-fair
bet;ifyouknowthatapersonalwaysturnsdown50-50lose$10/gain$11bets, youdon’tknowthatherutilityfunction
isconcaveeverywhere–itcouldbeconvexoversmallranges. (Forinstance, let X+z,@4￿
￿4
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+z ￿ 4<,5 for z 5 +4<3>533,.) Concavity is an additional assumption,
but I am confident that results hold approximately if we allow such small and silly non-convexities.
3in the table￿
4 All entries are rounded down to an even dollar amount.
j
O $101 $105 $110 $125
$400 400 420 550 1,250
$600 600 730 990 4
$800 800 1,050 2,090 4
$1,000 1,010 1,570 4 4
$2,000 2,320 4 4 4
$4,000 5,750 4 4 4
$6,000 11,810 4 4 4
$8,000 34,940 4 4 4
$10,000 4 4 4 4
$20,000 4 4 4 4
Wdeoh 4
If averse to 50-50 lose $100/gain j bets for all wealth levels,
will turn down 50-50 lose O/gain J bets; J’s entered in table.
So, for instance, if a person always turns down a 50-50 lose m￿ff/gain m￿￿f gamble, she will
always turn down a 50-50 lose $800/gain $2,090 gamble. Entries of 4 are literal: Somebody who
always turns down 50-50 lose $100/gain $125 gambles will turn down any gamble with a 50%
chance of losing $600. This is because the fact that the bound on risk aversion holds everywhere
implies that LE￿￿ is bounded above.
The theorem and corollary are homogenous of degree 1: If we know that turning down 50-50
lose ,/gain } gambles implies you will turn down 50-50 lose u/gain C, then for all %:f, turning
down 50-50 lose %,/gain %} gambles implies you will turn down 50-50 lose %u/gain %C. Hence
the u ’m ￿ f cfff, } ’m ￿ f ￿entry in Table 1 tells us that turning down 50-50 lose m￿f/gain $10.10
gambles implies you will turn down 50-50 lose $1,000/gain 4 gambles.
The reader may worry that the extreme risk aversion shown in Table 1 relies heavily on the
assumption that the person will turn down the given gamble for all initial wealth levels. It doesn’t.
While without knowing a global lower bound on a person’s modest-stakes risk aversion we cannot
assert thatshe’llturn downgambleswith infiniteexpected return, Table2indicatesthatthelack ofa
lower bound does not salvage the plausibility of expected-utility theory. Table 2 shows calibrations
if we know the person will turn down 50-50 lose $100/gain } gambles for initial wealth levels
7 The theorem provides a lower bound on the concavity of the utility function, and its proof indicates an obvious
way to obtain a stronger (but uglier) result. Also, while the theorem and applications focus on ‘‘50-50 bets’’, the point
is applicable to more general bets. For instance, if an expected-utility maximizer dislikes a bet with a 25% chance of
losing $100 an a 75% chance of winning $100, then she would turn down 50-50 lose $100/gain $300 bets, and we
could apply the theorem from there.
4less than $300,000, indicating which gambles she’ll turn down starting from initial wealth level of
$2bfcfff. Large entries are approximate.
j
O $101 $105 $110 $125
$400 400 420 550 1,250
$600 600 730 990 36,000,000,000
$800 800 1,050 2,090 90,000,000,000
$1,000 1,010 1,570 718,190 160,000,000,000
$2,000 2,320 69,930 12,210,880 850,000,000,000
$4,000 5,750 635,670 60,528,930 9,400,000,000,000
$6,000 11,510 1,557,360 180,000,000 89,000,000,000,000
$8,000 19,290 3,058,540 510,000,000 830,000,000,000,000
$10,000 27,780 5,503,790 1,300,000,000 7,700,000,000,000,000
$20,000 85,750 71,799,110 160,000,000,000 540,000,000,000,000,000,000
Wdeoh 5
Table 1 replicated, for initial wealth level $290,000, when
o@j behavior is only known to hold for z ￿ ’633>333.
If we only know that a person turns down 50-50 lose $100/gain $125 bets when her lifetime
wealth is below $300,000, we also know she will turn down a 50-50 lose $600/gain $36 billion bet
beginningfromlifetime$290,000.
5 Theintuitionisthattheextremeconcavityoftheutilityfunction
between $290,000 and $300,000 assures that the marginal utility at $300,000 is tiny compared to
the marginal utility at wealth levels below $290,000; hence, even if the marginal utility does not
diminish at all above $300,000, a person won’t care nearly as much about money above $300,000
as she does about amounts below $290,000. The choice of $290,000 and $300,000 as the two focal
wealth levels is arbitrary; all that matters is that they are $10,000 apart. As with Table 1, Table 2
is homogenous of degree 1, where the wedge between the two wealth levels must be multiplied by
the same factor as the other entries. Hence — multiplying Table 2 by 10 — if an expected-utility
maximizer would turn down a 50-50 lose$1,000/gain $1,050gamblewhenever her lifetimewealth
is below $300,000, then from an initial wealth level of $200,000 she will turn down a 50-50 lose
$40,000/gain $6,356,700 gamble.
While these ‘‘non-parametric’’ calibrations are less conducive to analyzing more complex ques-
tions,Table3providessimilarcalibrationsfordecisionsthatresemblereal-worldinvestmentchoices
8 Careful examination of Tables 1 and 2 show that most entries that are not 4 in Table1 showup exactly thesame in
Table 2. Thetwo exceptions arethoseentries that areabove $10,000 — sinceTable2 implicitly makes no assumptions
about concavity for gains of more than $10,000, it yields lower numbers.
5by assuming conventional functional forms of utility functions. It shows what aversion to various
gamblesimpliesforthemaximumamountofmoneyapersonwithaconstant-absolute-risk-aversion
(CARA) utility function would be willing to keep invested in the stock market, for reasonable as-
sumptions about the distribution of returns for stocks and bonds.
o@j ￿ [
$100/ $101 .0000990 $14,899
$100/ $105 .0004760 $3,099
$100/ $110 .0009084 $1,639
$100/ $125 .0019917 $741
$100/ $150 .0032886 $449
$1,000/ $1,050 .0000476 $30,987
$1,000/ $1,100 .0000908 $16,389
$1,000/ $1,200 .0001662 $8,886
$1,000/ $1,500 .0003288 $4,497
$1,000/ $2,000 .0004812 $3,067
$10,000/ $11,000 .0000090 $163,889
$10,000/ $12,000 .0000166 $88,855
$10,000/ $15,000 .0000328 $44,970
$10,000/ $20,000 .0000481 $30,665
Wdeoh 6
If a person has CARA utility function and is averse to 83@83 lose $o/gain $j bets for all wealth levels, then
1) she has coefficient of absolute risk aversion no smaller than￿ and 2) invests $[ in the stock market
when stock yields are normally distributed with mean real return 9=7( and standard deviation 53(> and
bonds yield a riskless return of 3=8(.
Hence,anexpected-utilitymaximizerwithCARApreferenceswhoturnsdown50/50lose$1,000/gain
$1,200 gambles will only be willing to keep $8,875 of her portfolio in the stock market, no matter
how large her total investments in stocks and bonds. If she turns down a 50/50 lose $100/gain $110
bet, she will be willing to keep only $1,600 of her portfolio in the stock market — keeping the rest
in bonds (which average 6% lower annual return). While it is widely believed that investors are
too cautious in their investment behavior, no one believes they are this risk averse.
3. Discussion and Conclusion
Expected-utility theory may well be a useful model of the taste for very-large-scale insurance.
6
Despite its usefulness, however, there are reasons why it is important for economists to recognize
9 While there is also much evidence for some limits of its applicability for large-scale risks, and the results of this
paper suggest an important flaw with the expected-utility model, the specific results do not of course demonstrate that
the model is unuseful in all domains.
6how miscalibrated expected-utility theory is as an explanation of modest-scale risk aversion. For
instance, some research methods economists currently employ should be abandoned because they
rely crucially on the expected-utility interpretation of modest-scale risk aversion. One example
arises in experimental economics. In recent years, there has been extensive laboratory research in
economics in which subjects interact to generate outcomes with payoffs on the order of $10 to $20.
Researchers are often interested in inferring subjects’ beliefs from their behavior. Doing so often
requires knowing therelative value subjects hold for different money prizes; if a person chooses $5
in event A over $10 in event B, we know that she believes A is at least twice as likely as B only if
we can assume the person likes $10 at least twice as much as $5. Yet economic theory tells us that,
because of diminishing marginal utility of wealth, we should not assume people like $10 exactly
twice as much as $5. Experimentalists (e.g., Davis and Holt (1993, pp. 472-6)) have developed a
clever scheme to avoid this problem: Instead of prizesof $10 and $5, subjectsare given prizes such
as 10% chance of winning $100 vs. 5% chance of winning $100. Expected-utility theory tells us
that, irrespective of the utility function, a subject values the 10% chance of a prize exactly twice as
much as the 5% chance of winning the same prize.
The problem with this lottery procedure is that it is known to be sufficient only when we main-
tain the expected-utility hypothesis. But then it is not necessary — since expected-utility theory
tells us that people will be virtually risk neutral in decisions on the scale of laboratory stakes. If
expected-utility theory is right, these procedures are at best redundant, and are probably harmful.
7
On the other hand, if we think that subjects in experiments are risk averse, then we know they
are not expected-utility maximizers. Hence the lottery procedure, which is motivated solely by
expected-utility theory’s assumptions that preferences are linear in probabilities and that risk atti-
tudes come only from the curvature of the utility-of-wealth function, has little presumptive value
in ‘‘neutralizing’’ risk aversion. Perhaps there are theories of risk attitudes such that the lottery
: Ifexpected-utilitytheory explained behavior, theseprocedureswould surely notbeworth theextraexpense, northe
loss in reliability of the data from making experiments more complicated. Nor should experimentalists who believe
in expected utility theory ever be cautious about inferences made from existing experiments that don’t use the lottery
methods out of fear that the results are confounded by the subjects’ risk attitudes.
7procedure is useful for neutralizing risk aversion — but expected-utility theory isn’t one of them.
8
A second example of problematic research methods relates to the logic underlying the theorem:
Expected-utility theory makes wrong predictions about the relationship between risk aversion over
modest stakes and risk aversion over large stakes. Hence, when measuring risk attitudes main-
taining the expected-utility hypothesis, differences in estimates of risk attitudes may come from
differences in the scale of risk comprising data sets, rather than from differences in risk attitudes of
the people being studied.
9 Data sets dominated by modest-risk investment opportunities are likely
to yield much higher estimates of risk aversion than data sets dominated by larger-scale investment
opportunities. So not only are standard measures of risk aversion somewhat hard to interpret given
that people are not expected-utility maximizers, but even attempts to compare risk attitudes so as
to compare across groups will be misleading unless economists pay due attention to the theory’s
calibrational problems.
The problems with assuming that risk attitudes over modest and large stakes derive from the
same utility-of-wealth function relates to a long-standing debate in economics. Expected-utility
theory makesapowerfulprediction thateconomicactorsdon’tseeanamalgamation ofindependent
gamblesassignificantinsuranceagainsttheriskofthosegambles; theyareeitherbarelylesswilling
or barely more willing to accept risks when clumped together than when apart. This observation
was introduced in a famous article by Samuelson (1963), who showed that expected-utility theory
implies that if (for some sufficiently wide range of initial wealth levels) a person turns down a
particular gamble, then she should also turn down an offer to play ?:￿ of those gambles. Hence,
inhisexample, ifSamuelson’scolleagueisunwillingtoaccepta50-50lose$100/gain$200gamble,
then he should be unwilling to accept 100 of those gambles taken together. Though Samuelson’s
theorem is ‘‘weaker’’ than the one in this paper, it makes manifest the fact that expected-utility
; Indeed, the observation that diminishing marginal utility of wealth is irrelevant in laboratory experiments raises
questions about interpreting experimental tests of the adequacy of expected-utility theory. For instance, while show-
ing that existing alternative models better fit experimental data than does expected-utility theory, Harless and Camerer
(1994)showthatexpected-utilitytheorybetterfitsexperimentaldatathandoes‘‘expected-valuetheory’’—risk-neutral
expected-utility theory. But because expected-utility implies that laboratory subjects should be risk neutral, such evi-
dence that expected-utility theory explains behavior better than expected-value theory is evidence against expected-
utility theory.
< Indeed, Kandel and Stambaugh (1991, pp. 68-69) discuss how the plausibility of estimates for the coefficient of
relative risk aversion may be very sensitive to the scale of risk being examined. Assuming constant risk aversion,
they illustrate how a coefficient of relative risk aversion needed to avoid predicting absurdly large aversion to a 50/50
lose $25,000/gain $25,000 gamble generates absurdly little aversion to a 50/50 lose $400/gain $400 gamble. They
summarize such examples as saying that ‘‘Inferences about [the coefficient of relative risk aversion] are perhaps most
elusive when pursued in the introspective context of thought experiments.’’ But precisely the same problem makes
inferences from real data elusive.
8theory predicts that adding together a lot of independent risks should not appreciably alter attitudes
towards those risks.
Y et virtually everybody would find the aggregated gamble of 100 50-50 lose $100/gain $200
bets attractive. It has an expected yield of $5,000, with negligible risk: There is only a ￿
.ff chance
of losing any money and merely a
￿
2Dcfff chance of losing more than $1,000.
10 While nobody would
turn down this gamble, many people, such as Samuelson’s colleague, might reject the single 50-50
lose $100/gain $200 bet.
11 Hence, using expected-utility theory to make inferences about the risk
attitudes towards the amalgamated bet from the reaction to the one bet — or vice versa — would
be misleading.
What does explain risk aversion over modest stakes? While this paper provides a ‘‘proof by cal-
ibration’’ that expected-utility theory does not help explain some risk attitudes, there are of course
more direct tests showing that alternative models better capture risk attitudes. There is a large liter-
ature (see Machina (1987) and Camerer (1992) for reviews) of formal models of such alternatives.
Many of these models seem to provide a more plausible account of modest-scale risk attitudes,
allowing both substantial risk aversion over modest stakes and non-ridiculous risk aversion over
large stakes, and researchers (e.g., Segal and Spivak (1990), Loomes and Segal (1994), Epstein
and Zin (1990)) have explicitly addressed how non-expected-utility theory can help account for
small-stake risk aversion.
Indeed, what is empirically the most firmly established feature of risk preferences, loss aver-
sion, is a departure from expected-utility theory that provides a direct explanation for modest-scale
risk aversion. Loss aversion says that people are significantly more averse to losses relative to
the status quo than they are attracted by gains, and more generally that people’s utilities are deter-
mined by changes in wealth rather than absolute levels.
12 Preferences incorporating loss aversion
can reconcile significant small-scale risk aversion with reasonable degrees of large-scale risk aver-
43 The theorem in this paper predicts that, under exactly the same assumptions invoked by Samuelson, turning down
a 50-50 lose $100/gain $200 gamble implies the person turns down a 50-50 lose $200/gain $20,000 gamble. This has
an expected return of $9,900 – with zero chance of losing more than $200.
44 As Samuelson noted, the strong statement that somebody should turn down the many bets if and only if she turns
down the one is not strictly true if a person’s risk attitudes change at different wealth levels. Indeed, many researchers
(e.g., Hellwig (1995) and Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987)) have explored features of the utility function such that an
expected-utilitymaximizer mighttakea multipleofa favorablebetthatthey wouldturn downinisolation. Butcharac-
terizing suchinstances isn’trelevantto examples of the sort discussedby Samuelson. Weknowfromthe unwillingness
to accept a 50/50 lose $100/ gain $200 gamble that Samuelson’s colleague was not an expected-utility maximizer.
45 Loss aversion was introducedby Kahnemanand Tversky (1979)as partof themoregeneral‘‘prospecttheory’’, and
is reviewed in Kahneman, Knetch, and Thaler (1991). Tversky and Kahneman (1991) and others have estimated the
loss-aversion-to-gain-attraction ratio to be about 2:1.
9sion.
13 A loss-averse person will, for instance, be likely to turn down the one 50/50 lose $100/gain
$200 gambleSamuelson’scolleagueturned down, but willsurely accept onehundred such gambles
pooled together. Variants of this or other models of risk attitudes can provide useful alternatives to
expected-utility theory that can reconcile plausible risk attitudes over large stakes with non-trivial
risk aversion over modest stakes.
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Appendix: The Theorem and a Corollary
Theorem: Suppose that for all ￿, LE￿￿ is strictly increasing and weakly concave. Suppose that
there exists ￿:￿ , }:,:f such that for all ￿ 5 d￿c￿o, ￿DLE￿ ￿ ,￿n￿DLE￿ n }￿ ￿L E￿￿.
Then for all ￿ 5 d￿c￿o, for all %:fc
1) If } ￿ 2, then LE￿￿ ￿ LE￿ ￿ %￿ ￿ ;
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,a n doE￿￿ ￿ LE￿￿ ￿ LE￿ ￿ ,￿.
ProofofPart 1of Theorem: Fornotational easeand without lossofgenerality, letoE￿￿ ￿ LE￿￿￿
LE￿ ￿ ,￿’￿ .T h e nc l e a r l yLE￿ ￿ ,￿ ￿ LE￿ ￿ 2,￿ ￿ ￿, by the concavity of LE￿￿. Also, since
46 While most formal definitions of loss aversion have not made explicit the assumption that people are substantially
risk averse even for very small risks (but see Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin (1999) for an explicit treatment of this
issue), most examples and calibrations of loss aversion imply such small-scale risk aversion.
47 But Kahneman and Lovallo (1993), Benartzi and Thaler (1995), and Read, Loewenstein, and Rabin (1998) argue
thatan additionaldeparturefromstandard assumptionsis implicated in many risk attitudes is thatpeople tend to isolate
different risky choices from each other in ways that lead to different behavior than would ensue if these risks were
consideredjointly. Samuelson’s colleague, for instance, might reject each50/50 lose$100/gain $200 gamble if oneach
of100dayshewereofferedonesuchgamble, whereashemightacceptallofthesegamblesiftheywereofferedtohimat
once. BenartziandThaler (1995) arguethatarelatedtypeofmyopiaisanexplanationfor the‘‘equitypremiumpuzzle’’
—the mystery aboutthecuriouslylargepremiumonreturns thatinvestorsseemtodemandtocompensatefor riskiness
associated with investing in stocks. Such risk aversion can be explained with plausible (loss-averse) preferences — if
investors are assumed to assess gains and losses over a short-run (yearly) horizon rather than the longer-term horizon
for which they are actually investing.
102,:}:, , we know that ￿ ￿ 2, n } 5 E￿ ￿ ,c￿￿, and by the concavity of LE￿￿ we know that









Hence, if ￿ ￿ 2, ￿ ￿, we know that LE￿ ￿ 2,￿ ￿ LE￿ ￿ ￿,￿ ￿
}
, since by assumption,
LE￿￿2,￿,￿nLE￿￿2,n}￿ ￿ 2￿E￿￿2,￿. Byconcavity,wealsoknowthatLE￿￿￿,￿￿LE￿￿e,￿ ￿
}
,. More generally, if ￿ ￿ 2&, ￿ ￿, then
LE￿ ￿E2& ￿ ￿￿,￿ ￿LE￿ ￿ 2&,￿ ￿ LE￿ ￿ 2E& ￿ ￿￿,￿ ￿ LE￿ ￿E2& ￿ ￿￿,￿
, LE￿ ￿ 2&,n }￿ ￿LE￿ ￿ 2&,￿ ￿
}
,
dLE￿ ￿ 2E& ￿ ￿￿,￿ ￿ LE￿ ￿ E2& ￿￿￿,￿
, LE￿ ￿ 2&,￿ ￿ LE￿ ￿E2& n￿ ￿ ,￿ ￿
}
,
dLE￿ ￿ 2E& ￿ ￿￿,￿ ￿ LE￿ ￿ E2& ￿￿￿,￿o
TheselowerboundsonmarginalutilitiesyieldthelowerboundontotalutilitiesLE￿￿￿LE￿￿%￿
in part 1 of the theorem.
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ProofofPart2 ofTheorem: Again letoE￿￿ ￿ LE￿￿￿LE￿￿,￿’￿ . ThenLE￿n}￿￿LE￿￿ ￿ ￿.
Bythe concavityof L, LE￿n}￿￿LE￿n}￿,￿ ￿
,
}.B u ti f￿n} ￿ ￿, thisimplies byassumption
that LE￿ n2 }￿ ￿ LE￿ n }￿ ￿ ,
} (since LE￿ n } ￿,￿nLE￿ n2 }￿ ￿ 2LE￿ n }￿￿.
More generally, we know that if ￿n6} ￿ ￿, then LE￿ n6} n}￿￿LE￿n6}￿ ￿ ,
}dLE￿ n
6}￿￿LE￿n6}￿}￿o. Theseupper bounds on marginal utilities yield theupper bound on utilities
LE￿ n %￿ ￿ LE￿￿ in part 2 of the theorem.
Corollary: Supposethat for all ￿, L￿E￿￿ : f and L￿￿E￿￿ ￿ f￿Supposethereexists}:,:f such
that, for all ￿, ￿DLE￿ ￿ ,￿n￿DLE￿ n }￿ ￿L E￿￿. Then for all positive integers &, ;6￿6 E&￿,
￿DE￿ ￿ 2&,￿n￿DLE￿ n 6}￿ ￿LE￿￿,w h e r e6E&￿ ￿ ;
A A A ?







































































. Solving for 6 yields the formula. Note that if }:2,, we only need
LE￿￿ ￿LE￿ ￿ 2&,￿ ￿ 2&ELE￿￿ ￿ LE￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ to get the result.
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